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NOTE
FAMILY LAW-PARENTAL KIDNAPPING IN ARKANSAS UNDER
THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT AND PARENTAL
KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT. Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 289 Ark.
479, 713 S.W.2d 451 (1986).
Suzanne Norsworthy filed for divorce in 1984, left her husband
in Texas and moved to Arkansas with her 7-year-old daughter,
Darlah, in June of 1985. Suzanne had temporary custody of Darlah
under a Texas decree entered April 10, 1984. Approximately three
and one-half months after the move to Arkansas, Lauren Nor-
sworthy, Darlah's father, contacted Suzanne to say he was coming to
Arkansas and would like to visit Darlah. Suzanne agreed.
The following day, Lauren filed for divorce and custody in
Texas, came to Arkansas, picked up Darlah (ostensibly for a brief
visit), and returned to Texas with her. Suzanne was served with pro-
cess later that week in the Texas suit Lauren had filed, and so she
promptly filed suit for divorce and custody in the Chancery Court of
Crittenden County, Arkansas. Lauren moved to dismiss the action,
based on a section of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act'
(UCCJA) which provides that a court shall not exercise jurisdiction in
a child custody dispute if a proceeding is pending in another state.2
Alternatively, Lauren asked that the Crittenden County Chancery
Court stay its proceeding until the Texas court determined whether or
not Texas was the proper forum for the action.
The Arkansas chancery court, holding that it had jurisdiction
under the UCCJA,3 found that Suzanne had custody of Darlah pursu-
ant to the temporary custody order of the district court of Harris
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2726 (Supp. 1985).
2. A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act... if at the
time of filing the petition a proceeding ... was pending in a court of another state
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act, unless the proceed-
ing is stayed by the court of the other state ....
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2706(a) (Supp. 1985).
3. (a) A court of this State... has jurisdiction to make a child custody determina-
tion by initial or modification decree if: . . . (2) it is in the best interest of the child
that a court of this State assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or
the child and at least one [1] contestant, have a significant connection with this State,
UALR LAW JOURNAL
County, Texas, and entered an order in accordance therewith.4 The
order also directed the immediate return of Darlah to Arkansas.
Lauren failed to return the child to Suzanne and the Arkansas court
held him in contempt and sentenced him to ninety days in jail. Again
relying on the UCCJA as the basis for jurisdiction, and holding fur-
ther that Arkansas was the most convenient forum under the Act,'
the chancellor entered a divorce decree in favor of Suzanne, and
awarded Suzanne custody of Darlah, child support, and attorney's
fees.
Lauren appealed the decision, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
modified the decree and remanded the case to chancery court. The
supreme court held that even though jurisdiction could be predicated
under the UCCJA because it was in the best interest of the child for
Arkansas to assume jurisdiction, the Act also mandates that the Ar-
kansas court stay the proceeding and communicate directly with the
foreign court to determine which is the more appropriate forum to
decide custody. 6 The court also noted that under the Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act of 19807 (PKPA) jurisdiction is conferred ex-
clusively upon the child's home state, which in this case was Texas."
When the PKPA conflicts with the UCCJA, the preemptive PKPA
controls. 9 Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 289 Ark. 479, 713 S.W.2d 451
(1986).
The child custody decree is unique in that the recognition and
deference given to it by other states will often determine whether the
purposes and effects it seeks to achieve are accomplished. Until re-
cently, some states had relatively relaxed standards relating to cus-
tody decree challenges and were "friendly forums" for child snatching
and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships ....
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).
4. Norsworthy v. Norsworthy, 289 Ark. 479, 481, 713 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1986) (citing
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(2) (Supp. 1985)).
5. Id. at 482, 713 S.W.2d at 453 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2707(a) (Supp. 1985)
which provides: "A court which has jurisdiction under this Act ... to make an initial or
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction ... if it finds that it is an inconve-
nient forum ... ").
6. Id. at 485-87, 713 S.W.2d at 455-56; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2706(a) (Supp. 1985).
See supra note 2.
7. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-73 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982)).
8. 289 Ark. at 484-85, 713 S.W.2d at 455.
9. Id. at 482, 713 S.W.2d at 453.
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parents.' 0 Even at present, the problem of the "friendly forum" is
widespread and has spawned many vicious legal battles, frequently
creating inconsistent results."
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution commands
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the [judicial
proceedings] . . . of every other State."' 12 It is obvious that a child
custody proceeding is a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of
the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution. Despite this
fact, non-custodial parents can easily find a "friendly forum" willing
to modify a valid custody decree.
The problem of the "friendly forum" arises in that while a decree
awarding custody is final on conditions then existing, it may always be
modified by a showing of changed circumstances. 3 The United States
Supreme Court, in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,'4 held that cus-
tody decrees are not entitled to "full faith and credit" since a sister
state should have "as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to
qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was ren-
dered.""' Thus, sister states are free to modify existing custody de-
crees under the same circumstances that would have warranted
modification in the original granting state.'
6
Prior to the advent of the UCCJA and PKPA, Arkansas courts
developed general rules of law for determining whether to modify an
existing custody decree. A threshold consideration was that of juris-
diction. '1I The supreme court consistently held that the physical pres-
10. Note, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Application and Interpretation, 23 J.
FAM. L. 419, 428 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Maxie v. Fernandez, 649 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1986) (conflicting decrees
from Virginia and the District of Columbia); Alexander v. Ferguson, 648 F. Supp. 282 (D. Md.
1986) (conflicting decrees from New York and Maryland); Davis v. Davis, 638 F. Supp. 862
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (conflicting decrees from Illinois and Minnesota); Wyman v. Lamer, 624 F.
Supp. 240 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (conflicting decrees from Colorado and Indiana).
12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
13. Hamilton v. Anderson, 176 Ark. 76, 78, 2 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1928); Jackson v. Jack-
son, 151 Ark. 9, 13, 235 S.W. 47, 48-49 (1921); Weatherton v. Taylor, 124 Ark. 579, 582, 187
S.W. 450, 451 (1916).
14. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
15. Id. at 614-15. Accord May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
16. Another view has been expressed by the Arkansas courts in support for a denial of full
faith and credit for custody decrees. The supreme court in Tucker v. Turner, 195 Ark. 632,
639, 113 S.W.2d 508, 511 (1938) stated that the full faith and credit clause applied only to
foreign judgments relating to property and because children were wards of the court and not
property, the full faith and credit clause was therefore inapplicable. The supreme court has
cited this view with acceptance as recently as 1976. Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 561, 535
S.W.2d 218, 220 (1976).
17. The three bases of jurisdiction as stated by the court in Edrington v. Fitzgerald, 257
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ence of the child within Arkansas was a sufficient basis upon which to
exercise jurisdiction in determining whether there should be a change
in custody. 8 It reasoned that the state in which a child is physically
present has the most immediate concern with the child and may be
the best qualified jurisdiction to determine the child's welfare. 19 In
Keneipp v. Phillips, 20 the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "the
general rule, as well as that declared here by this court, is that...
when the domicile of a child [changes] and it becomes a citizen of
another state ... such child is no longer subject to the control of the
courts of the first state." 2'
Once a custody decree has been entered, the general rule is that
the parent seeking modification must show a change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant the change sought.22 Accordingly, the supreme
court has refused to enforce modifications made by courts in other
states, where there was no proper showing of changed circumstances
to warrant the modification ordered.2" The Arkansas Supreme Court
in Bonds v. Lloyd 24 found that the paramount consideration in award-
ing custody of children is the best interest and welfare of the child.25
Changed circumstances are determined primarily in light of the wel-
fare and best interest of the child, and not as a reward or punishment
for the parents.26
Another consideration in the modification of a custody decree
Ark. 61, 65, 514 S.W.2d 712, 714 (1974), are domicile of child in the state, or presence of child
in the state, or personal jurisdiction over the contending parties.
18. Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 560, 535 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1976); Edrington v. Fitzger-
ald, 257 Ark. 61, 65, 514 S.W.2d 712, 714 (1974); Shaw v. Shaw, 251 Ark. 665, 673, 473
S.W.2d 848, 852 (1971).
19. Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 561, 535 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1976).
20. 210 Ark. 264, 196 S.W.2d 220 (1946).
21. Id. at 267, 196 S.W.2d at 222. See also Edrington v. Fitzgerald, 257 Ark. 61, 70, 514
S.W.2d 712, 716 (1974); Tucker v. Turner, 195 Ark. 632, 637, 113 S.W.2d 508, 511 (1938).
22. Pyle v. Pyle, 254 Ark. 400, 402-03, 494 S.W.2d 117, 119 (1973); Frazier v. Merrill,
237 Ark. 242, 245-46, 372 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1963); Hamilton v. Anderson, 176 Ark. 76, 78, 2
S.W.2d 673, 674 (1928); but see Sanders v. Sanders, 1 Ark. App. 216, 222, 615 S.W.2d 375, 379
(1981) ("If the welfare of the child so requires, a decree may be modified without a change in
circumstances.")(quoting Phelps v. Phelps, 209 Ark. 44, 189 S.W.2d 617 (1945)).
23. Keneipp v. Phillips, 210 Ark. 264, 268, 196 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (1946). See also Fra-
zier v. Merrill, 237 Ark. 242, 372 S.W.2d 264 (1963) (upholding a foreign modification decree
challenged for lack of changed circumstances). But see Sanders v. Sanders, 1 Ark. App. 216,
615 S.W.2d 375 (1981) (holding that if the welfare of the child so requires, a decree may be
modified without a change in circumstances).
24. 259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976).
25. Id. at 560, 535 S.W.2d at 220.
26. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 156 Ark. 383, 386, 246 S.W. 492, 493 (1923). See also Tucker v.
Turner, 195 Ark. 632, 638, 113 S.W.2d 508, 511 (1938); Hamilton v. Anderson, 176 Ark. 76,
79, 2 S.W.2d 673, 674 (1928).
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was the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the existing decree
sought to be changed.2 7 For example, if the court that rendered the
original decree lacked jurisdiction to do so, the decree was invalid and
not binding on the parties involved.28 Consequently, the court in
which the modification was sought was free to decide the custody is-
sue in the best interest of the child.29
These rules conferred wide discretion upon the Arkansas courts
to modify foreign custody and modification decrees. 3° The traditional
willingness of states to find changed circumstances and modify cus-
tody decrees from other states encouraged parents to abduct children
and flee across state lines in search of a "friendly forum."31
In an effort to redress this situation, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act.32 The UCCJA has now been adopted in
some form by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.3 3 Arkansas
adopted the uniform act in 1979.34
The general purposes of the UCCJA are to: (1) avoid jurisdic-
tional competition and conflict with courts of other states;35 (2) pro-
mote cooperation with courts of other states;36 (3) assure that
litigation takes place in the state in which the child and his family
have the closest connection; 37 (4) discourage continuing controversy
over child custody in the interest of greater home environment stabil-
ity and family relationship security; 38 (5) deter abductions and other
unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody
awards; 39 (6) avoid re-litigation of foreign custody decisions when fea-
27. See cases cited supra note 22.
28. Cooper v. Cooper, 229 Ark. 770, 771-72, 318 S.W.2d 587, 588 (1958).
29. Id. at 772, 318 S.W.2d at 589.
30. Bonds, 259 Ark. at 562-63, 535 S.W.2d at 221.
31. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child
and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1980) [hereinafter PKPA Hearing] (statement of Paul Michel). See also Blakesley,
Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 295-96 (1986).
32. 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1979). See also Blakesley, supra note 31, at 296-97.
33. Walker & Freed, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 18 FAM. L.Q. 369, 428
(1985).
34. Act of Feb. 9, 1979, No. 91, 1979 Ark. Acts 204 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-
2701 to -2726 (Supp. 1985)).
35. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2701(a)(1) (Supp. 1985).
36. Id. § 34-2701(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).
37. Id. § 34-2701(a)(3) (Supp. 1985).
38. Id. § 34-2701(a)(4) (Supp. 1985).
39. Id. § 34-2701(a)(5) (Supp. 1985).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
sible; ° (7) facilitate enforcement of decrees of other states;4' (8) pro-
mote and expand the exchange of information between two states
concerned with the same child;42 and (9) make uniform the law of
those states that enact it.
4 3
To further these purposes, the UCCJA sets forth four jurisdic-
tional bases for determining a custody dispute." An Arkansas court
may exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJA when:
(1) Arkansas is the home state of the child (defined as the state in
which the child resided for at least six months immediately
preceding the time involved, including periods of temporary
absence),45 or had been the home state of the child prior to
his removal or retention by another claiming custody, and a
parent or guardian continues to live in this state;46 or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that an Arkansas court
assume jurisdiction because the child and at least one of the
contestants have significant connections with this state and
there is substantial evidence available concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training and personal rela-
tionships;47 or
(3) the child is physically present in the state, and the child has
been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect
the child;48 or
(4) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction
under prerequisites in accordance with the paragraphs above
or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to deter-
mine custody, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.49
The two principal bases of jurisdiction under the Act are the home
40. Id. § 34-2701(a)(6) (Supp. 1985).
41. Id. § 34-2701(a)(7) (Supp. 1985).
42. Id. § 34-2701(a)(8) (Supp. 1985).
43. Id. § 34-2701(a)(9) (Supp. 1985).
44. Id. § 34-2703(a) (Supp. 1985).
45. Id. § 34-2702(5) (Supp. 1985).
46. Id. § 34-2703(a)(1) (Supp. 1985). The supreme court noted in Davis v. Davis, 285
Ark. 403, 407-08, 687 S.W.2d 843, 846 (1985), that when none of the parties reside in the state
of the original decree or the state of the original decree no longer has jurisdiction under the
UCCJA standards, the child's home state is the proper forum for litigation.
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(2) (Supp. 1985). See supra note 3.
48. Id. § 34-2703(a)(3) (Supp. 1986). Arkansas has limited the applicability of this sec-
tion to extreme or extraordinary situations where the immediate health and welfare of the
child is at stake. Caskey v. Pickett, 274 Ark. 383, 386, 625 S.W.2d 473, 475 (1981). Thus, it is
rarely invoked as a basis for jurisdiction.
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(4) (Supp. 1985).
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state and significant connection/substantial evidence bases.5" Con-
flicts arise between these two sections because the latter is broad
enough to confer jurisdiction on one state even though another state
remains the home state of the child.5 In other words, situations can
and do arise where two states have concurrent and conflicting juris-
diction.52 For example, in Sanders v. Sanders,5 3 the Arkansas Court
of Appeals exercised jurisdiction under the "significant connection/
substantial evidence" basis, even though the child had been in Arkan-
sas less than six months and California remained the child's home
state under the UCCJA.5 4 Both California and Arkansas possessed
jurisdiction under the Act.
While not solving all aspects of conflicting jurisdiction, the
UCCJA has limited the exercise of jurisdiction based merely on the
presence of the child in Arkansas. Except under jurisdictional bases
invoked only in extraordinary situations, 5 physical presence of the
child in Arkansas, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon an Arkansas court. 56 This
is contrary to Arkansas decisions rendered prior to adoption of the
Act.
57
Nevertheless, because the UCCJA's flexible provisions can be in-
terpreted so as to permit two states to assert jurisdiction in a custody
dispute, the UCCJA fails to deter states that are determined to exer-
icse jurisdiction in order to protect their parochial interests.58 The
existence of concurrent jurisdiction continues to promote forum shop-
ping for the non-custodial parent.59
Recognizing that custody disputes are an increasing problem and
that judicial decisions have been marked by inconsistencies and con-
50. Biggers v. Biggers, I1 Ark. App. 62, 66, 666 S.W.2d 714, 716 (1984).
51. See PKPA Hearing, supra note 31, at 144-45.
52. PKPA Hearing, supra note 31, at 144-45.
53. 1 Ark. App. 216, 615 S.W.2d 375 (1981).
54. Id.
55. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(3), (4) (Supp. 1985). Cf Caskey v. Pickett, 274 Ark.
383, 625 S.W.2d 473 (1981) (§ 34-2703(a)(3) is limited to extreme or extraordinary situations).
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(b) (Supp. 1985).
57. See Bonds v. Lloyd, 259 Ark. 557, 535 S.W.2d 218 (1976) (finding that the state where
the child is physically present has the most immediate concern with the child and may be the
best qualified jurisdiction to decide custody); Edrington v. Fitzgerald, 257 Ark. 61, 514 S.W.2d
712 (1974) (noting that presence of the child in the state is a valid jurisdictional base); Shaw v.
Shaw, 251 Ark. 665, 473 S.W.2d 848 (1971) (noting that a court of this state had the power to
make child custody decrees regardless of simultaneous jurisdiction of courts of other states if
the child was present and it was in his best interest).
58. Note, supra note 10, at 421.
59. PKPA Hearing, supra note 31, at 144-45.
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flicting results among various jurisdictions, 60 President Carter signed
into law the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,61 on De-
cember 28, 1980. The PKPA establishes national standards for deter-
mining and resolving jurisdictonal disputes over custody matters, as
well as for determining the extent that decrees of one jurisdiction will
be given full faith and credit in another jurisdiction.62
The PKPA was intended to fill in some of the gaps of the
UCCJA.6 3 It has been urged that a patent defect of the UCCJA was
that it is not mandatory.'M The UCCJA is merely a uniform draft
which any state is free to adopt, model its own statute after, or totally
disregard as it chooses. At the time the PKPA was enacted, some
states had not yet adopted the UCCJA.65 These states became child
snatching havens for the discontented parent.66 The PKPA, a federal
statute, makes deference to custody decrees mandatory and prevents
states which have less rigid requirements under their version of the
UCCJA from quickly modifying valid decrees.67
The crucial distinction 68 between the UCCJA and the PKPA is
that the PKPA gives exclusive jurisdiction to the child's home state.6 9
This result is achieved by the mutually exclusive and preferentially
ranked jurisdictional bases of the PKPA.70 The PKPA establishes
60. S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF CHIL-
DREN 121 (1981).
61. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
62. S. KATZ, supra note 60, at 121.
63. Note, supra note 10, at 426.
64. Id. at 420.
65. Id. at 420 n.6.
66. Id. at 420.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982). Under the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, when federal and state statutes conflict, the federal statute
will prevail. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Tufares v. Wright, 98
N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522 (1982). Therefore, when the PKPA and UCCJA conflict, the PKPA
controls.
68. The following are additional distinctions between the UCCJA and the PKPA. The
PKPA provides continuing jurisdiction in the original awarding state where the original decree
complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the state continues to have jurisdiction under its own laws,
and the child or one of the parents continues to reside there. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(E), (d)
(1982). The PKPA expressly provides that full faith and credit be given to child custody
determinations of other jurisdictions while the UCCJA involves a statutory enactment of the
common law doctrine of comity. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982). The PKPA makes the Federal
Parent Locator Service available in child custody cases and in cases of parental kidnapping. 42
U.S.C. §§ 654, 663 (1982). The PKPA also makes the Federal Fugitive Felony Act applicable
to interstate abductions of children, 18 U.S.C. § 1073 note (1982).
69. For a more complete discussion of the PKPA, see Note, supra note 10, at 419; Blake-
sley, supra note 31, at 291.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A),(B),(C),(D),(E) (1982).
[Vol. 10:69
1987-88] CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
four alternative bases of jurisdiction that closely parallel those found
in the UCCJA.7 ' However, unlike the UCCJA, significant connec-
tion/substantial evidence jurisdiction cannot exist when another state
is the child's home state,7 2 because the home state is the preferred
basis of jurisdiction under the PKPA. Accordingly, at least in theory,
only one state may properly exercise jurisdiction over the determina-
tion of the custody dispute and child snatching will be of little help to
the non-custodial parent.7 3  This is so because, even though the
PKPA directly applies only to modification proceedings, it indirectly
governs initial custody determinations as well, since a custody decree
that fails to conform to the PKPA requirements will not be entitled to
full faith and credit in another state.74
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A)(c) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the
provisions of this section only if-
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) One of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the com-
mencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State
within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding
and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention
by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in
such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subpar-
agraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such
State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State
other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available
in such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child be-
cause he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subpar-
agraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise juris-
diction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is
in the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this
section.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1982) allows jurisdiction to be exercised based on the
significant connections/substantial evidence test only if "it appears that no other state would
have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A)," subparagraph (A) being the home state provision.
73. PKPA Hearing, supra note 31, at 48.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982) requires that the full faith and credit command of the
PKPA be applicable only to a "custody determination made consistently with the provisions of
this section." Therefore, the court entering the initial decree must also follow the PKPA pro-
visions in order to avoid having a court of another state modify the original decree without
regard to the PKPA.
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The interacting provisions of the PKPA and UCCJA were ap-
plied by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Norsworthy v. Norsworthy"
to determine whether jurisdiction had been properly exercised by an
Arkansas court. In Norsworthy a suit for divorce and custody was
filed in Texas by the father, and an identical suit was subsequently
filed in Arkansas by the mother. In deciding whether the Arkansas
chancery court had jurisdiction to issue the decree, the supreme court
noted that a primary objective of the UCCJA is to "deter abductions
and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain cus-
tody awards."'7 6 This objective would have been thwarted if Lauren
Norsworthy were allowed to achieve summary dismissal of a suit filed
by the mother in response to his abduction of his daughter merely by
having filed suit in Texas before executing the abduction. 7 Such a
result would encourage methods of obtaining custody that the
UCCJA was plainly designed to prevent.78
The supreme court found that the chancery court was not neces-
sarily required to dismiss the suit filed there despite the fact that a
similar suit was already pending in Texas. The UCCJA required the
court to defer jurisdiction only if the Texas court was exercising juris-
diction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. 79 The court de-
termined that the record was unclear as to the basis of Texas'
jurisdictional claims, since the child had never been to Henderson
County, Texas, and there was no evidence of a connection between
the child and that county. 0 Nevertheless, though it concluded that
dismissal was not required, the supreme court held that the Arkansas
chancery court erred in rendering a decree without first communicat-
ing with the Texas courts8 ' regarding which forum was more appro-
75. 289 Ark. 479, 713 S.w.2d 451 (1986).
76. Id. at 483, 713 S.W.2d at 454 (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2701(a)(5) (Supp.
1985)). The statute expressly directs that it be construed to promote its objectives. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2701(b) (Supp. 1985).
77. 289 Ark. at 483, 713 S.W.2d at 454.
78. Id.
79. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2706(a) (Supp. 1985).
80. 289 Ark. at 483, 713 S.W.2d at 454.
81. The Court acknowledged that there had also been a suit pending in Harris County,
Texas, before either of the two suits at issue (Henderson County, Texas, and Crittenden
County, Arkansas) were filed. The court stated that the status of the Harris County suit was
not entirely clear, although it was apparently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Although
paying little attention to the suit throughout the opinion, in conclusion, the court stated, "We
think, therefore, it was incumbent on the Arkansas court before proceeding to a final decree, to
enter into direct communication with one or both District Courts in Texas to determine . ..
which was the better forum to decide custody." Id. at 487, 713 S.W.2d at 456 (emphasis
added). If the Harris County suit is to be considered, it raises the additional issue of whether
the continuing jurisdiction provision of the PKPA would require Arkansas to defer to the
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priate.82 Even when jurisdiction can be maintained under the
UCCJA, it requires that once the court is informed of another pend-
ing proceeding, it shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the
court in which the other proceeding is pending. 83 The court deter-
mined that this provision is mandatory, and that the purposes of the
UCCJA are not served when a court, with knowledge that the subject
matter of child custody is pending in another state, ignores the foreign
proceeding. 84 Accordingly, the chancery court was required to stay
its proceeding and communicate with the Texas court (or courts) 85
before assuming jurisdiction.
The supreme court also noted that the chancery court did not
consider the requirements of the PKPA before rendering the decree.
86
The chancery court based jurisdiction on the significant connection/
substantial evidence provision of the UCJA, 87 and although jurisdic-
tion could be properly maintained under that section, Texas was the
child's home state under both the UCCJA and the PKPA.8  Both
acts define home state as the state in which the child, immediately
preceding the time involved, lived with his parents or a parent for at
least six consecutive months, not considering temporary absences.89
Until Darlah and Suzanne had lived in Arkansas for six consecutive
months, Texas remained Darlah's home state. Unlike the UCCJA, in
which concurrent jurisdiction can exist in two states under the home
state provision9" and the significant connection/substantial evidence
provision,91 respectively, the PKPA does not recognize significant
connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction where another state is
the child's home state.92 Thus, Arkansas could not maintain jurisdic-
tion consistently with the provisions of the PKPA, and a decree ren-
court in Harris County, Texas. The PKPA provides that a state shall have continuing jurisdic-
tion if the state made a custody determination consistently with the provisions of the PKPA, if
that state continues to have jurisdiction under its own laws (the UCCJA), and the state re-
mains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982).
82. 289 Ark. at 487, 713 S.W.2d at 456.
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2706(c) (Supp. 1985).
84. 289 Ark. at 486, 713 S.W.2d at 455. See also Bowden v. Bowden, 182 N.J. Super. 307,
440 A.2d 1160 (1982); Bonis v. Bonis, 420 So. 2d 104 (Fla. App. 1982).
85. 289 Ark. at 487, 713 S.W.2d at 456. See also supra note 81.
86. 289 Ark. at 482, 713 S.W.2d at 453.
87. Id. at 481, 713 S.W.2d at 453.
88. Id. at 484, 713 S.W.2d at 455 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2702(5) (Supp. 1985) and
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (1982)).
89. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2702(5) (Supp. 1985); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) (1982).
90. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2703(a)(1) (Supp. 1985).
91. See Id. § 34-2703(a)(2) (Supp. 1985).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1982). See also, I J. MCCAHEY, M. KAUFMAN, C. KRAUT
& J. ZETI', CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.06[1],[2],[3] (1986).
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dered inconsistently would not be entitled to full faith and credit in
foreign states. Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court remanded
the case for further proceedings in accordance with the UCCJA and
the PKPA.
93
The problem of parental kidnapping is greater today than ever
before. With the high incidence of divorce prevalent in our society,
ten million children have the benefit of only one parent in their house-
hold. Because many kidnappings between parents go unreported, ac-
curate statistics are unavailable. However, "it is estimated that
between 25,000 and 100,000 children are victims of interstate child
snatchings each year." '94
The Norsworthy decision is significant because it shows the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court's willingness to follow the letter of the PKPA
and the UCCJA in combatting child snatching. Despite the fact that
the PKPA was enacted in 1980, it has been mentioned in only one
other Arkansas case.95 As mentioned earlier, neither party cited the
PKPA in their briefs, lending support to the contention that it had
been virtually overlooked by the courts until now.
The PKPA, through its exclusive deference to home state juris-
diction, theoretically defeats concurrent jurisdiction over child cus-
tody disputes. However, cases continue to arise in other jurisdictions
in which two states have issued conflicting custody decrees, both pur-
porting to be in compliance with the PKPA,96 in derogation of the
objectives of the Act. This has led to suits being filed in federal dis-
trict courts around the country seeking a determination as to which of
the two conflicting state decrees is valid.97 Federal courts are split as
to whether the PKPA was intended to furnish a private cause of ac-
tion in federal court to enforce decrees rendered under the PKPA.
The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that a federal cause of action exists,98 while the
93. 289 Ark. at 487, 713 S.W.2d at 456.
94. Note, supra note 10 at 419 (citing statement of Senator Mathias, PKPA Hearings,
supra note 31).
95. O'Daniel v. Walker, 14 Ark. App. 210, 686 S.W.2d 805 (1985).
96. See, e.g., Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986); Olmo v. Olmo, 646 F. Supp.
233 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
97. See, e.g., Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia and Florida); Mc-
Dougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (1 th Cir. 1986) (Florida and Washington); Heartfield v.
Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana and Texas); DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743
F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984) (New Jersey and North Carolina); Leyda v. Roach, 650 F. Supp. 951
(S.D. Iowa 1987) (Iowa and Florida); Olmo v. Olmo, 646 F. Supp. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (New
York and Colorado).
98. Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465
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Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits have held to the contrary. 99 The United States Supreme
Court has granted a writ of certiorari in Thompson v. Thompson 100 to
decide the question and end the inconsistency among the circuits.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, unlike courts of other states, has
shown its determination to avoid conflicting adjudications and to pro-
mote cooperation between states, thereby reducing the need for fed-
eral court intervention in custody matters. By interpreting the
provisions of the UCCJA and PKPA strictly and in good faith, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has set itself apart from those states that
continue to exercise jurisdiction in contravention of the clearly stated
purposes of the UCCJA, thereby increasing the amount of litigation
in the federal court system.
Because of the unique factual setting of Norsworthy, it could be
argued that the PKPA may benefit child snatchers as it possibly has
in this case. Although practically correct, the benefit in Norsworthy
was achieved, not by seeking loopholes in the Act, but through strict
application of the law.
Although the result in Norsworthy may seem unjust, it shows the
Arkansas Supreme Court's determination to follow the letter and
spirit of both the UCCJA and PKPA, whatever the outcome. It
seems to follow that under the more typical situation, where the child
snatcher brings the child into Arkansas from another state seeking a
favorable determination from Arkansas courts, the strict interpreta-
tion of the PKPA and UCCJA chosen by the Arkansas Supreme
Court will prevent Arkansas from becoming a "friendly forum" to
child snatching parents seeking to change valid custody decrees.
Jennifer Sevier Farmer
(1 th Cir. 1986); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); DiRuggiero v. Rod-
gers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
99. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 964
(1987); Lloyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
100. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 964
(1987).
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